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TERRY AND THE RELEVANCE OF
POLITICS
TRACEY L. MEARES*

My commentary will be congenial with those of Judge Weinstein and Randy Kennedy insofar as I would characterize myself
as a Terry supporter rather than a Terry opponent. Therefore,
I'll be arguing against some of the points that Tracey Maclin has
made-with a caveat. The caveat is that Tracey Maclin has
made incredibly good points for the case that Terry was wrongly
decided when it was decided. The question we must answer today, however, is whether Terry is right for today.
Professor Maclin argues that the Terry Court should have
followed the Miranda2 Court model-a model in which the Court
takes a more interventionist approach to law enforcement practice to insure that liberty interests are protected.3 Professor
4 to
Maclin might also find the Court's approach in Papachristou
be supportive of his argument. Papachristou,as I will argue in a
moment, shares similarities with Terry, although the cases came
out differently.
In both Miranda and Papachristou the Supreme Court
adopted an approach that I believe was obviously right for the
time in which those cases were decided. What is not so clear,
however, is whether those principles are readily applicable to the
current political and social context. Professor Maclin is concerned about the protection of rights of Black people today. So
am I. However, I am more confident than Professor Maclin is,
about the contemporary relevance of the principles embodied in
Terry.
*
1
2

Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965) (holding that under the Fifth

Amendment a suspect shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself and
must be apprised of his right to counsel).
3 See Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and
Police Discretion,72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1271 (1998).
4 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
(1971).
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I will make this argument by focusing on the connection between Terry on the one hand, Papachristou,on the other, and the
relationship of both of these cases to modern community policing
practices. Politics will loom large in this discussion.
Both Professors Maclin and Kennedy have talked about the
effects of institutionalized racism on Black communities. History clearly demonstrates that institutionalized racism disabled
Black people from holding law enforcers politically accountable
to them. There are at least two predictable effects when Black
people are unable to hold law enforcers politically accountable to
them.
The first, Professor Maclin emphasizes, is overpolicing. Professor Kennedy emphasizes the second, underpolicing. These
twin factors supply the main reasons why Black communities in
the sixties were profoundly dissatisfied with the police services
that they received.
It is against the background of these twin factors that the
Court fashioned its well-known array of procedural protections
in criminal cases like Miranda and Papachristouand many of
the other search and seizure cases decided during the sixties.'
During this period the Court fashioned what I will call the
"sixties conception of rights." That conception of rights is animated by two principles. The first is community distrust, and
the second is discretion skepticism.
The community distrust principle can be useful when an entire segment of the relevant local political community is disenfranchised and despised. In such a situation, there is no reason
to presume that the democratic approval given to invasive law
enforcement procedures or laws is evidence that the individuals
who will be most affected by these procedures and laws view
their impact on liberty as justified by their contribution to order.
This, of course, is the typical approach to articulating procedure
in the criminal law area. We presume that the democratic process dictates the appropriate balance between liberty and order.
But when one group is excluded, there is much less reason to
trust so-called democratic judgments.
The courts in such a situation understandably adopt a position of community distrust. We have clear evidence of this phe5 The argument that follows is developed at greater length in Dan M. Kahan &
Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of CriminalProcedure,86 GEO. L.J.
1153 (1998).
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nomenon in Papachristou. In that case, the Court invalidated a
very vague Florida loitering law.6 I believe that the Court was
responding to the distorting effects of institutionalized racism on
the criminal justice system, even though it never mentioned anything about race or racism. The author of Papachristou,Justice
Douglas, made such a point elsewhere prior to writing the opinion in the case. Justice Douglas wrote, in a Yale Law Review
article in 1960, that it is naive to defer to the community's approval of vagrancy and loitering laws because those arrested
typically come from minority groups with insufficient political
clout to protect themselves from an "easy laying-on of hands by
the police."7
Professor Maclin echoes this point in his critique of Terry.8
And, again, given the period in which Terry was decided, his argument is likely well-founded. Is it well-founded today? Before I
answer that question, let me turn to the second principle.
Discretion skepticism is the second principle that animated
decisions such as Papachristouand Miranda. Discretion skepticism is, of course, responsive to institutional racism by insisting
that law enforcement be exercised according to very precise
rules. By imposing such rules on law enforcers, courts impeded
the responsiveness of law enforcers to the demands of racist
white political establishments. In this way, discretion skepticism is an anti-delegation doctrine.
Community distrust and discretion skepticism are key features of a case like Papachristou. Papachristouis very relevant
to our discussion of Terry, of course, because it is all about lowlevel interactions between police and the policed in urban areas-and about interactions between police and minorities, in
particular.9
In Professor Maclin's view, however, Terry fails precisely because it does not share these features of Papachristou. Because
it does not, Professor Maclin worries that the Terry doctrine
6

See FLA. STAT. ANN. §856.02 (West 1994) (repealed 1972). The defendants

were actually convicted under a Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance which was very
similar to the Florida statute. See Papachristou,405 U.S. at 157 n.2. The Court vacated a conviction under the Florida law in light of Papachristou,in a companion
case, Smith v. Florida,405 U.S. 172 (1972).
7 William 0. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 Yale L.J. 1, 13
(1960).
S See Maclin, supra note 3.
See Papachristou,405 U.S. at 162.
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provides far too little protection for minorities who encounter the
police."0
To justify his argument, Professor Maclin tells us a great
deal about political and social landscapes of the fifties and sixties. He cites compelling evidence quoted from the Kerner
Commission Report." His data should cause us to be worried
about the prudence of Terry for 1968. But what about 1998?
What I want to argue now is that even if Terry's flexibility
wasn't so great for 1968, Terry does provide a useful framework
for 1998. The kind of flexibility Terry calls for embodies principles that are more useful to inner city Blacks than the rigid
model of rights developed in cases such as Papachristou. This is
in part because, as Judge Weinstein has so aptly noted, the political and social landscape has changed immensely since 1968.12
Perhaps we have not achieved all that we would like to achieve,
but things have changed a great deal since the Voting Rights Act
of 196513 was enacted. The results of that law are obvious and
dramatic. There are minority people at all levels of government-federal, state, and local. 4 Moreover, because of these
changes, police forces have changed immensely in step with the
demographic changes in political office.
In short, it is just not plausible to presume that an antagonistic relationship must exist between minority individuals and
the police. In fact, in many urban areas, African Americans are
demanding innovative law enforcement solutions to the crime
problems that they face.
Consider the situation in Chicago, which I will focus on specifically because that is where I do most of my research. Minorities in Chicago are using their growing political power to secure
innovative solutions to the crime problems that they experience.
Black Chicagoans, like urban African Americans elsewhere, are
supplying the political energy behind the resurgence of curfew
laws, loitering laws, and the like.
Importantly, many minorities view these laws as tolerable
10 See

Maclin, supra note 3.
See id.
12 See Jack B. Weinstein & Mae C. Quinn, Terry, Race, and Judicial
Integrity:
The Court and Suppression During the War on Drugs, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1323
(1998).
13Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994)).
"4See Kahan & Meares, supra note 5, at 1154.
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modern alternatives to the draconian law and order, drug law
enforcement that Judge Weinstein mentioned earlier.15
Now, it is important to see that an application of the conception of rights most clearly illustrated by Papachristou,in
which community distrust and discretion skepticism are the
primary features, cuts these imminent community-based reforms
off at the start. I think this is a bad outcome.
It's bad because it stifles insurgent political energy in urban
minority communities and incentives to establish political channels between minority individuals and local governments. Such
an outcome exacerbates a bad situation by contributing to alienation of minorities in these communities.
This situation heightens a strange paradox. Prior to the
civil rights movement, disenfranchised minorities were abused
and no one was listening to them. They pushed for individual
rights to address that situation. Today, however, minorities increasingly are enfranchised and attempting to push for legislation that meets their particular needs, and the same schedule of
rights that provided them with relief before, too often, is being
used to prevent them from determining a course for their communities that they deem best.
There is another reason why the Papachristouinterpretation
of rights may be inferior to Terry's more flexible approach when
it comes to modern policing that addresses the needs of minorities who live in crime-plagued urban areas. Alternative law enforcement strategies often expose minority individuals to stiffer,
prison-based sentences that are imposed after the occurrence of
a crime that is more serious than the low-level activity addressed
by curfews and loitering laws.
By enforcing some of these low-level policing alternatives as
the first panel mentioned earlier, we can cut off robbery, homicide, and maybe even drug crimes.
Finally, adherence to the Papachristoumodel may be bad for
minority residents of urban communities precisely because in
many low-level policing situations it really does very little to address the problem of police discretion, which is Professor Maclin's primary target. Striking down a loitering law like the one
that was recently struck down by the Illinois Supreme Court in

" See Weinstein & Quinn, supra note 12.
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Chicago doesn't meaningfully cabin police discretion. 6 Police
still have discretion. They still use it, and they still stop people.
They will simply use some other law that the courts have found
to be specific enough to pass constitutional muster.
But when such laws are enforced, there are no low-level
guidelines to help police implement them, similar to the enforcement guidelines that were an integral part of Chicago's regime.
I think we need a better way of thinking of the rights at issue in these low-level situations, and Terry's flexible approach
points the way. At least two principles are useful to think about
at this point. The first is community burden sharing, and the
second is guided discretion.
I will address burden sharing first. We worry that a majority never shares in the burdens of law enforcement, and instead,
pushes those burdens off on a despised minority. In the past
courts have responded through community distrust.
But what if it could be said that everyone meaningfully
shares in the burden of a particular law enforcement procedure?
Something like this could be said of the broad searches that Professor Akhil Amar mentioned yesterday. He suggested that
maybe a broad search was not as bad as a more targeted one."
Similarly, Professor Bill Stuntz brought up the problem of the
targeting harm addressed by the Fourth Amendment.1 8 In short,
when it can be said that the relevant political community internalizes the burden of a particular enforcement procedure, courts
should relax scrutiny of the judgments about the balance between liberty and order produced by the political process.
But it is the guided discretion point that is more important
for our purposes here. Guided discretion is a way of demonstrating the relevance of the courts in the political world that Professor Kennedy spoke of. Rather than hoping to specify implementation of police discretion through hyper-precise rules, what the
court should do is open and reinforce the channels of political accountability between the community and the police. This is, in
'6 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S.
Ct. 1510 (1998) (No. 97-1121-CSY).
17 See Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment FirstPrinciples,
72 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 1097 (1998).
'8 See William J. Stuntz, Terry's Impossibility, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1213
(1998).
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my view, the best way of dealing with the exercise of law enforcement discretion in these low-level policing encounters.
How might a court do that? Well, one thing a court can do is
actually review the implementing police regulations that accompany a law like Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance when a
facial challenge is mounted, rather than arguing that such
regulations are irrelevant. 9 Such a court would find that the innovative regulations constrained police discretion in useful ways
by specifying which officers can enforce them, where they can enforce them, with reasonably detailed guidelines about what establishes probable cause to stop a gang member.
A court could determine how this procedural framework actually creates and reinforces a relationship between the community members and the police. In Chicago, of course, the community members were an integral part of that process. They
helped the commander designate which areas the gang loitering
ordinance should be enforced in, and they also helped the police
officers who enforce the law identify particular gang members
against which the law should be enforced.
In 1998, we simply cannot avoid the fact that the ballot box
is relevant. This is a point that Judge Juviler made yesterday.
We shouldn't be afraid of it. Terry may have been ahead of its
time in embracing politics, but it is certainly time for us to endorse its promise. Embracing the ballot box does not mean that
the majority rule will prevail and that minorities have no say
anymore, as I think the experience in Chicago demonstrates. To
be afraid of the ballot box, I think, gives minority individuals too
little credit.

'9 See CHICAGO ILL., CODE § 8-4-015 (1992) (providing for the gathering of information on criminal street gang activity, enhanced police patrol of areas having
gang activity, and a strong anti-loitering provision which allows police to force persons to disperse when police have probable cause to believe that gang members are
loitering).
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